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Abstract  
The EU Cohesion policy is based on a complex system of fiscal transfers, their 
main goal being to accelerate economic and social cohesion. In this paper, the 
contributions of the Structural funds and Cohesion fund (SFCF) to economic 
growth on national level while controlling for the institutional quality are tested. 
Aim of the paper is show whether institutional quality is a bottleneck for effective 
usage of SFCF. The analysis is based on the country-level data during 2000-2013 
period. In the presented econometric models, we emphasize the importance of the 
institutional quality on the economic growth. The results show that when 
Institutional Quality Indicator as a regressor is included together with the size of 
inflows from SFCF, SFCF inflows have no influence on economic growth. 
Moreover, we found that neither the institutional quality separately or in 
interaction with SFCF inflows, is a statistically significant factor for economic 
growth in the EU-27. The results are signifincantly different when we apply the 
same methodology on two subsamples, where we distinguish between countries 
with high and low level of institutional quality index. 
Keywords: SFCF, institutional quality, economic growth, convergence  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the EU Cohesion policy is to promote and support the 
overall harmonious development of its Member States and regions. To be more 
precise, the EUs Cohesion policy aims to strengthen economic and social 
cohesion by reducing disparities in the level of development between regions. EU 
funds (hereinafter Structural funds and Cohesion fund (SFCF)) are instruments 
for achieving beforementioned aims. Although it is easy to express purpose and 
aims of the EU Cohesion policy and although the instruments of achieving its 
goals are well known, multitude of empirical tests of the casual effects of the 
Policy on country and regional economic growth and convergence resulted in 
ambiguous findings. EU funds are managed and delivered by European 
Commission, the Member States and different stakeholders at the regional and 
local level, so it is obvious that all these actors need to be coordinated and that the 
quality of instutions is of vital importance for successful and effective absorption 
of SFCF. This paper empirically tests the importance of SFCF on economic 
growth, while controlling for the institutional quality. Aim of the paper is show 
whether institutional quality is a bottleneck for effective usage of SFCF, effective 
usage being considered as significant positive effect of SFCF on economic 
growth. The results show that institution matter only when dividing the sample of 
countries according to the quality of institutions (high vs low level of institutional 
quality index), while results of the tests on the full sample (27 EU countries) 
showed that both SFCS and institutional quality indices are not significant 
variables for explaining the economic growth of EU member states. 
The paper consists of five sections. After Introduction, second section 
includes literature review and theoretical framework for the research. Data and 
the applied methodology are presented in the third section. Fourth section 
contains the results of the estimated models and implications of it, while the fifth 
section concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH 
European Cohesian policy seems to be a puzzle for many researchers as 
consensus on the policy effectiveness does not exist. As if was mentioned in the 
previos section, many studies have tried to determine the effects of SFCF on 
economic growth and convergence, however most of the papers show ambiguous 
results. According to Pelegrinni et al. (2013), the reasons for the ambiguity are 
both data limitations and its comparability at regional level, and the struggle in 
separating the effects of the policy from the confounding effect of the other 
factors. Nonetheless, the increasing share of the EU budget devoted to Cohesian 
Policy require more profounded insights into the effects of the policy.  
Important contribution to understanding the presented topic was given 
by Capellen et al. (2003) where they empirically test the impact of regional 
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support on economic growth and convergence. Their sample includes the data 
spanning 17 years, in the period from 1980 to 1997, for regions of seven EU 
member states (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and 
UK). The results0 of analysis suggest that SFCF have a significant and positive 
imapact on the European region's growth, thus contributing to higher equality in 
productivity and income in observed regions. However, the authors also 
emphasize that the economic impact of regional support is much stronger in more 
developed regions and that such support is essentially dependent on the absorbing 
capacities of the receiving regioons, thus implying that support is least efficient 
where is most needed.  
Research conducted by Bouvet & Dall’Erba (2010), using SFCF data for 
each cohesion objective in the period from 1989 to 1993 and from 1994 to 1999 
(first two programming periods), analyses which variables, economic and 
political, determine the actual funds allocation. Considering then existing 
literature, which stated that the economic characteristics of the recipient regions 
alone cannot explain the entire SFCF distribution, their paper focuses on elements 
that have a major role in the allocation process: political bargaining and 
additional funds. Their study comprises data for 120 NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 regions 
of 12 EU conutries. They use regions on both NUTS levels because NUTS 2 
regions are not used as governmental units. Their results show that economic 
criteria are not the only determinants of funds allocation and that funds allocation 
is determined by political considerations. The results also suggest that the 
political situation within a country and a region and the relations between various 
layers of governance, determine the allocation process and that influences of 
national and regional political characteristics vary by cohesion objective. 
Pellegrini et al. (2013) discuss that some econometric analyses show 
significant positive impact of Regional policy on economic growth and 
convergence while some papers suggest only conditionally-positive effects which 
depend on the quality of institutions such as research conducted by Enderveen et 
al. in 2002 and 2006. Our paper builds on their research. 
Furthermore, Pellegrini et al. (2013) analyzed the effects of EU Regional 
policy but only for the regions with the GDP/pc below 75% of EU average 
(qualify for Objective 1 funds) in the period 1995 to 2006. The findings of their 
analysis suggest positive, but moderate effects on growth of the regions, 
indicating that GDP/pc on yearly average grows 0,8 percentage points more in 
treated regions than in not treated regions.  
In the following section, economic growth model that is theoretical 
bedrock of our paper will be presented. 
The neoclassical model of economic growth (Solow-Swan model) gave 
the starting point for a number of empirical studies of economic growth (Mankiw, 
Romer & Wiel, 1992; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Muslim, 1995; Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 2001) in an effort to explain the trends of economic growth and the 
factors that determine it. 
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A key aspect of the Solow-Swan's model is neoclassical form of 
production function that defines the level of production as a function of two main 
production factors, labor and capital, and which has the following main 
assumptions: yields on individual production factor are positive and decreasing, 
returns to scale are constant and there is a corresponding elasticity of substitution 
of production factors. The production function of this type, assuming a constant 
rate of savings, generates extremely simplified general equilibrium model of a 
closed economy, which assumes existance of a steady state in which the economy 
doesn’t grow, i.e. according to Solow-Swan model, the growth is possible only in 
transition to steady state. 
One implication of this model is the hypothesis of conditional 
convergence, which says that the countries that are currently at a lower level of 
economic development and which are distant from their steady state will achieve 
faster growth compared with the countries at a higher level of economic 
development. This property of the model is derived directly from the assumption 
of diminishing returns to capital. Economies with a lower level of capital per 
employee with respect to the long-term equilibrium level of capital per employee, 
achieve higher yields for an additional unit of capital and therefore have higher 
growth rates. This is so called conditional convergence, because the long-term 
stable level of capital equipment, labor and production per employee, depends on 
the rate of savings and investment, the growth of population and labor force and 
technology, which can vary from country to country. If we assume relatively 
homogenous group of countries where these variations are not as pronounced, the 
countries would converge around the same level of production per capita, i.e. 
these countries will achieve absolute convergence according to the Solow-Swan's 
model. 
In addition, the model implies that without continuous technological 
progress, also because of diminishing returns to capital, the growth will 
eventually come to a halt. Long-term growth rate per capita in this type of models 
is not explained, because it is entirely determined by the rate of technological 
progress, which is exogenous. Therefore, as an alternative to the neoclassical 
growth model, different endogenous growth models that explain the nature of 
long-term economic growth within the model were developed. 
Empirical analysis which will be carried out in this paper is conceptually 
similar to the analysis conducted by Ederveen et al. (2006) for a group of 13 
countries of the European Union for the 1965-1990 period. Theoretical bedrock 
of their paper is Solow-Swan's model of economic growth expanded with the 
introduction of human capital (first paper which introduced human capital in this 
context si that of Mankiw et al. (1992). The base model assumes neoclassical 
production function of the following form: 
௧ܻ = ܭ௧ఈܪ௧ఉ(ܣ௧ܮ௧)ଵିఈିఉ                   (1) 
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where Y is the output level, K is physical capital, H is human capital, L 
is labor, and A denotes the level of technology. Due to the assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital, we have that α + β <1, α>0, β> 0.  According to the 
assumptions of the model, growth of labor and technology is exogenously given 
(growth rate n for labor and g for technology respectively): 
ܮ௧ = ܮ଴݁௡௧                                                          (2a) 
ܣ௧ = ܣ଴݁௚௧                               (2b) 
Thus, the effective quantity of labor AtLt grows at a rate n+g. 
The production function in (1) can be expressed in the following form 
ݕ௧ = ݇௧ఈℎ௧ఉ                                              (3) 
where all variables are expressed per unit of effective labor: y = Y/AL, k 
= K/AL, and h = H/AL. Assuming that a constant part of income is invested in 
both capital forms (sk denotes physical while sh human capital), the growth of 
physical and human capital can be described by the following equations: 
ሶ݇ ௧ = ݏ௞ݕ௧ − (݊ + ݃ + ߜ)݇௧                                                        (4a) 
ℎሶ ௧ = ݏ௛ݕ௧ − (݊ + ݃ + ߜ)ℎ௧                                          (4b) 
where δ is the depreciation rate, which is same for physical and human 
capital. 
From equations (4a) and (4b) we can show steady states of per unit 
physical and human capital with the following equations: 
݇∗ = ൬ೞೖభషഁೞ೓ഁ೙శ೒శഃ൰
భ
భషഀషഁ
                                                                                   (5a) 
ℎ∗ = ቀೞೖഀೞ೓భషഀ೙శ೒శഃቁ
భ
భషഀషഁ                                                                                   (5b) 
If we insert expressions (5a) and (5b) in equation (3) and then take the 
natural logarithm, we obtain the following expression: 
ln(ݕ∗) = ഀభషഀషഁ ln(ݏ௞) + ഁభషഀషഁ ln(ݏ௛) − ഀశഁభషഀషഁ ln(݊ + ݃ + ߜ)                            (6) 
Furthermore, the neoclassical model predicts convergence of economic 
growth. If the y* is equilibrium level of income per unit of effective labor and yt is 
its level in time t, we can approximate the speed of converegence near the steady 
state as: 
೏(೗೙(೤೟))
೏೟ ୀ		ߣሾ݈݊(ݕ∗) − ݈݊(ݕ௧)ሿ                                                                       (7) 
where  λ = (n + g + δ) (1-α-β). Equation (7) implies that: 
݈݊(ݕ௧) = ൫1 − ݁ିఒ௧൯݈݊(ݕ∗) + ݁ିఒ௧݈݊(ݕ଴)                                                         (8) 
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where y0 is the level of income per unit of effective labor at the 
beginning of the observed period. Subtracting ln(y0) from both sides and 
substituting the expression for ln(y*), we obtain the following relation: 
݈݊(ݕ௧) − ݈݊(ݕ଴) = ൫1 − ݁ିఒ௧൯ ఈଵିఈିఉ݈݊(ݏ௞) + ൫1 − ݁ିఒ௧൯
ఉ
ଵିఈିఉ݈݊(ݏ௛) + 
൫1 − ݁ିఒ௧൯ ഀశഁభషഀషഁ݈݊(݊ + ݃ + ߜ)– ൫1 − ݁ିఒ௧൯݈݊(ݕ଴)                                          (9) 
Since the term on the LHS represents an approximation of the rate of 
growth of income per effective unit of labor, it follows that the growth rate is a 
function of the equilibrium level of income (of the rate of accumulation of 
physical and human capital and population growth plus of the rate of 
technological progress and the rate of depreciation) and the initial level of income 
per effective work. 
Equation (9) is the basis for the following regression equation:  
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݈݊(ݕ଴) + ߚଶ݈݊(ݏ௞) + ߚଷ݈݊(ݏ௛) + ߚସ݈݊(݊ + ݃ + ߜ) + ߝ       (10) 
Equation 10 was used for testing the assumptions of conditional 
convergence between different groups of countries in the 1960-1985 period using 
cross sections data (Mankiw et al., 1992), and longitudinal data (Islam, 1995). 
The existence of conditional convergence is confirmed if the parameter β1<0. 
Ederveen et al. (2006) were among the first who investigated the 
contribution of structural funds to economic growth of the EU countries on the 
country level data, using the conceptual framework from Mankiw. In their paper 
the growth regression, which is basically equation (10), is expanded with two 
additional independent variables: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݈݊(ݕ଴) + ߚଶ݈݊(ݏ௞) + ߚଷ݈݊(ݏ௛) + ߚସ݈݊(݊ + ݃ + ߜ) + 
+ߚହ݈݊ܵܨ+ߚ଺݈݊ܥܱܰܦܵܨ + ߝ			                                                                          (11) 
where lnSF is the natural logarithm of the share of SFCF in the GDP and 
the lnSFCOND is the same as before, but this time in interaction with various 
measures of quality institutions. The model is evaluated on the panel data for 13 
member countries and for the 7 five-year-periods from 1960 to 1995. Results of 
the analysis confirmed the existence of the economic growth convergence for the 
group of 13 member states, but also showed that structural funds do not have a 
positive effect on economic growth per se. Only in interactation with the 
importance of the institutional quality, SFCF have positive effect on GDP growth. 
In this paper we build on the paper from Ederveen et al. (2006), but we 
modify the econometric model as will be explained more in the following 
chapter. 
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3.  DATA AND THE METHODOLOGY 
All the data used in our investigation was obtained from secondary 
sources as indicated in Table 1. We obtained the data for 27 EU member states 
for 2000-2013 period from the following sources: 
Table 1 
The input data for analysis 
Sign Description Source 
y Real BDP per capita (PPS) Eurostat  
sk Share of gross fixed capital investments in GDP Eurostat 
sh Share of labor force with tertiary education level Eurostat 
EUF SFCF funds resources http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/en/policy/evaluations/
data-for-research/ 
BDP BDP in current prices Eurostat  
IQGE Government effectiveness indicator World Governance Indicators  
IQRL Rule of law indicator World Governance Indicators  
 
We point out that during the observed period some countries where not 
EU member states, but for those countries we included absorption of pre-
accession funds (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) that are build on the 
same principles as the “standard” EU funds. 
The estimated regression equation with all involved variables is the 
following: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݈݊(ݕ)௜,௧–ଵ + ߚଶ݈݊(ݏ௞)௜,௧ + ߚଷ݈݊(ݏ௛)௜,௧ + 
ߚସܥܴܫܵܧ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚହ݈݊(ܨܷܰܦ)௜,௧+ߚ଺ܫܳ௜,௧+ߚ଻݈݊(ܨܷܰܦ_ܫܳ)௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧            (12) 
wherein the index i denotes country in the sample (i = 1, ..., 27), t 
denotes the time (t = 2001, ..., 2013), while the variables are defined as follows: 
The dependent variable growth expresses the real annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita (hereinafter GDPpc) 
variable ln(y)i, t-1 is the natural logarithm of the level of GDPpc in the 
previous year (t-1). 
Variable ln(sk)i,t is the natural logarithm of the share of gross fixed 
capital formation in the GDP and is a proxy variable for the rate of accumulation 
of physical capital. 
variable ln(sh)i,t is the natural logarithm of labor force with tertiary level 
of education in total labor force and is a proxy variable for human capital. 
Variable CRISESi,t is a dummy variable with the value 1 for the 
(European debt) crisis years (from 2009 to 2013), 0 otherwise. We took this time 
span because, although some countries had prolonged crisis, this period is joint 
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denominator for crisis in practically all EU countries. Key independent variable in the 
model, ln(FUND), is expressed as the logarithm of the share of funds drawn from the 
structural and cohesion funds in the GDP (SFCF/GDP). 
The institutional quality is included as an independent variable separately 
(IQ)i,t and in interaction with the absorption of EU funds, ln(FUND_IQ)i,t. There is no 
universal indicator that could be used and that can be said that it is the best measure of 
the institutional quality. A wide range of indicators, individually or collectively, may be 
a potential proxy for the institutional quality. Since the publication Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which is from 1996 published annually by the World 
Bank, contains six indicators, we selected two that best fit the context of our analysis: 
Government effectiveness indicator - IQGE) and the Rule of law indicator - IQRL. 
Since the correlation between the two indices is very high (r = 0.94), we took their 
average as an unique indicator of the institutional quality. 
Before performing regression analysis, and in order to examine the impact of 
cohesion policy instruments to economic growth of EU member states and the role of 
the institutional quality, we will first present the GDPpc dynamics for all Member States 
within the observed period. 
Figure 1 shows GDPpc growth trends during 2000-2013 period, where we 
also differentiate between old (blue colored) and new EU member states (after 2004 and 
2007 enlargement; red colored). 
 
Figure 1: GDPpc growth for the old and new EU members 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
After a period of stable growth (2000-2007) visible signs of crisis are 
noticeable in 2008, when there is a slowdown in growth in almost all countries, and 
when the majority of EU15 countries recorded a slight decline in GDPpc. However, the 
strongest impact of the crisis is visible in the year 2009, the year in which the level of 
GDPpc recorded substantial declines in all Member States (with Poland being 
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exception). From 2009 until 2013, the growth was on average lower when compared to 
the period before the crisis, and with considerable differences in the recovery trends of 
individual member states. While in most countries the recovery process began 
immediately after 2009, in some countries the impact of the crisis was prolonged 
(Cyprus, Greece, Spain recorded a negative growth rate after 2009). Very successful and 
speedy recovery and above average growth rates are observed in Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia. 
Looking at the differences in GDPpc across member states, Luxembourg 
sticks out because it has roughly twice the level of GDPpc compared to EU15 average 
(and EU27 as well obviously). Throughout the entire period range, variation of GDPpc 
across member states is very large. GDPpc of old members states is at roughly two time 
bigger than the new member states, although in the observed period, some new member 
states (Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Estonia) had greater GDPpc growth when 
compared with the least developed old member states (Greece and Portugal). 
Table 2 contains of σ-convergence of GDP per capita for all countries of the 
EU.1   
Table 2:  
Results of σ-convergence 
EU27 
 
    year |   sd 
---------+---------- 
    2000 | .5631443 
    2001 | .5373824 
    2002 | .5147537 
    2003 | .487287 
    2004 | .472922 
    2005 | .4509342 
    2006 | .4353804 
    2007 | .4093853 
    2008 | .3838834 
    2009 | .3837897 
    2010 | .3806013 
    2011 | .3736378 
    2012 | .3601264 
    2013 | .3576203 
---------+---------- 
   Total | .4572191 
-------------------- 
EU27 w/o Luxembourg 
 
    year |   sd 
---------+---------- 
    2000 | .5271326 
    2001 | .5040517 
    2002 | .4792877 
    2003 | .4502265 
    2004 | .4331638 
    2005 | .4111637 
    2006 | .3883917 
    2007 | .3586946 
    2008 | .3315055 
    2009 | .3342691 
    2010 | .327819 
    2011 | .3151181 
    2012 | .3017069 
    2013 | .2956056 
---------+---------- 
   Total | .4159484 
-------------------- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Results of σ-convergence show that the variation of the logarithm of 
GDPpc over the years is gradually reducing. This confirms the existence of the 
                                                            
1 We calculated the standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita for EU27 member states 
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convergence process of economic growth of the member states in the observed 
period. 
The remainder of this paper is focused on the estimation and estimation 
results of pre-specified regression equation (12), which also examines the 
existence of, and the estimated speed of convergence (the concept of β-
convergence). However, the primary task of this analysis is to determine whether 
the SFCF funds significantly contributed to the growth of all or maybe only one 
group of the EU member States, and whether the institutional quality affect the 
effectiveness of SFCF funds.  
 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to estimate equation (12) we choose between three estimators: 
 pooled ordinary least squares estimator (POLS) 
 fixed effects estimator (FE) 
 random effects estimator (RE) 
The choice of method was based on the results of the evaluation of the 
basic model with only the basic explanatory variables of the growth regression, 
which means that the regression equation (12) becomes: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݈݊(ݕ)௜,௧–ଵ + ߚଶ݈݊(ݏ௞)௜,௧ + ߚଷ݈݊(ݏ௛)௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧            (13) 
Since the POLS assumes that the variation between panel units is 
homogenous and that the estimated constant (β0) is common to all panel units, it 
is very likely that the obtained estimates are biased. The reason for the biasness is 
in specific characteristics of individual economies, that is, because of individual, 
country-specific effects that affect economic growth and obviously vary across 
states but not vary with time.  
By including individual effects on countries, regression equation is the 
following: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݈݊(ݕ)௜,௧–ଵ + ߚଶ݈݊(ݏ௞)௜,௧ + ߚଷ݈݊(ݏ௛)௜,௧ + ߙ௜ + ߝ௜,௧            (14) 
where the individual effects αi can be considered in two ways: 1) as correlated 
with regressors (FE assumption) or 2) not correlated with regressors (RE assumption). 
So, the assumption of the strict exogeneity connected with RE model requires that there 
must be no correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables of the 
model. Moreover, not only that the assumptions between POLS and FE are different, 
but the mathematical derivation of both FE and RE with respect to POLS differ. 
Namely, FE estimator uses demeaning of the variables, while RE does quasi-
demeaning, since it uses parameter theta that multiplies the mean values of the 
respective variables. Technical details behind calculations are discusess in Baltagi 
(2005). 
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Obviously, due to the differences in calculation, the results between POLS and 
RE on one side and FE on other will vary. FE model shows that the speed of the 
convergence process  is far higher than that indicated by the POLS model. The effects of 
both physical and human capital to growth are positive and significant.  
The results of the estimations of the equation 14 using POLS, FE and RE 
estimators are shown in the Table 3. 
Table 3 
Results of the estimation of equation 14 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 POLS FE RE 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth 
    
lnY    
L1 -.0435461    -.1896388***   -.0473567***    
 (.0058656) (.0205955) (.0068331)     
lnSK .0058656     .1619755***  .0866243***    
 (.0140604) (.019358) (.0149171)      
lnSH .0067252     .1178933***  .0072809 
 (.006976)      (.0235748)      (.0081628) 
Constant .198612     1.047983***   .2138725** 
 (.0773532)      (.1511131)      (.0849963)      
Observations 351 351 351 
R-squared 0.2746 0.3240 0.2598 
Number of id 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Estimated parameters in all cases have expected sign. For POLS 
estimation, the estimated convergence coefficient (-0.0435) has a negative sign, 
and the coefficient of investment rates (0.0799) positive, and both are statistically 
significant. However, surprisingly, the human capital shows insignificant for 
economic growth of the EU countries.  
Sign and values of the parameters obtained from after POLs and RE 
estimations are rougly the same, but since it is plausible to assume heterogeneity 
between panel units (countries), main candidates for further testing of the main 
hypothesis of the paper are RE and FE. A decision on whether the RE model is 
acceptable in relation to the FE model was made after applying the Hausman test, 
the results of which are presented in Table 4. The hypothesis of the independence 
of the individual effects and other regressors is rejected, and we concluded that 
the parameters after aplying RE estimator are not consistent, which in turn 
indicates that the FE is a suitable one for further analysis. Given that according to 
tests the best choice for conducting the analysis model FE, it will be used  for the 
rest of the analysis. 
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Table 4 
Results of the Hausman test 
 (b) (B) (b-B) 
 FE RE Difference 
lnY    
L1.  -.1896388     -.0473567        -.1422821         
lnSK .1619755      .0866243         .0753512         
lnSH .1178933 .0072809         .1106125 
chi2(3) 68.71   
Prob>chi2 0   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
4.1.  Results for all member states 
For further analysis, the basic FE model was expanded with additional 
explanatory variables. We estimated the equation 12 with all variables included as 
well as with stepwise inclusion of additional variables in order to check how the 
estimates change as we add additional variables.  Results for the whole sample of 
27 members (EU-27) are shown in Table 5.2 
Table 5 
Results of the estimation of equation 12 for EU27 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
L.lnY -0.165*** -0.192***  -0.195*** -0.175***    -0.184*** 
 (-7.77)    (-6.96)   (-6.60)  (-6.92)     (-6.97)    
lnSK 0.121***      0.133***      0.132***      0.122***      0.131*** 
 (5.80)        (5.91)        (5.91)        (5.61)        (5.68)    
lnSH 0.147***      0.146***      0.150***      0.154***      0.145*** 
 (5.96)        (6.44)        (5.74)        (5.54)        (6.24) 
Cruise -0.0269***    -0.0254***    -0.0251***    -0.0261***    -0.0255*** 
 (-4.33)       (-3.98)       (-3.78)       (-3.95)       (-3.95) 
lnFUND  0.0210        0.0182   
  (1.99) (1.66)   
IQ   0.0170 0.0268  
   (0.74)        (1.25)  
LnFUND_IQ     0.00921    
     (1.80)    
Constant 
included 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 
R-squared 0.343 0.348 0.348 0.345 0.347 
Number of id 27 27 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                                                            
2 Results are based on the corrected standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
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As expected, the crisis has significantly reduced the annual growth rate 
of the EU countries (on average by about 2.6% lower than in the period before the 
crisis). Rates of physical and human capital have the expected positive impact on 
economic growth and are statistically significant and negative and statistically 
significant value assessment parameter to the level of initial income confirms the 
existence of convergence of the economic growth of member countries. Models 
which are in various ways involved variable intensity withdrawals structural and 
cohesion funds and the level of institutional quality (columns 2-5) shows that 
neither the share of funds in the GDP and the institutional quality separately 
(columns 2-4), nor interact (column 5) were not statistically significant economic 
growth factors for EU27 as a whole. 
4.2.  Results for EU15 and NMS12 
EU member state make very heterogeneous group of countries and it is 
possible to make the assessment of previous regressions on two separate samples, 
one sample including the EU15 countries and second one including NMS12 (New 
Member States, that is EU member states after 2004 and 2007). 
Table 6 shows the results obtained for the EU15 sample. 
Table 6 
Results of the estimation of equation 12 for EU15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
L.lnY -0.245***     -0.243***     -0.249***     -0.251***     -0.241*** 
 (-4.47)           (-4.49)   (-4.78)       (-4.70)       (-4.47)    
lnSK 0.107*        0.111**       0.116**       0.111**       0.109*   
 (2.92)        (2.99)        (3.36)        (3.23)        (2.97)    
lnSH 0.147**       0.144**       0.141**       0.144**       0.144** 
 (3.75)        (3.74)        (3.52)        (3.56)        (3.70)    
Cruise -0.0181*         -0.0170* -0.0165*          -0.0178* -0.0170* 
 (-2.80)           (-2.51)   (-2.66)       (-2.89)       (-2.55)    
lnFUND  0.0188 0.0219   
  (1.17) (1.48)   
IQ   -0.0204 -0.0177  
   (-0.81) (-0.76)  
LnFUND_IQ     0.0117    
     (1.12) 
Constant 
included 
YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 
R-squared      
Number of id 15 15 15 15 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Results are actually similar to those obtained for the entire sample EU27. 
Statistically significant are the parameters that confirm the existence of convergence, the 
contribution of investment in physical and human capital, and the impact of the crisis, 
while EU funds and the institutional quality again have no statistically significant effect. 
There are no major changes in the size of the estimates of the parameters, except for the 
coefficient of convergence that for this sample shows much faster convergence of GDP 
per capita in relation to the group EU27.  
Table 7 contains results for the group NMS12 and does not show significantly 
different results. SFCF resources again do not have a statistically significant impact on 
the economic growth; convergence exists, but the countries converge much slower 
compared to the EU15, while the impact of the crisis on the reduction of the rate of 
growth has been stronger. 
Table 7 
Results of the estimation of equation 12 for EU12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
L.lnY -0.150***     -0.174***     -0.197**      -0.168**      -0.164*** 
 (-5.05)       (-4.82)       (-3.97)       (-3.95)       (-4.58) 
lnSK 0.128**       0.137**       0.143**       0.133**       0.137** 
 (4.00)        (4.00)        (3.64)        (3.64)        (3.67)    
lnSH 0.170***      0.153**       0.153**       0.171***      0.153** 
 (4.74)        (4.09)        (3.97)        (4.66)        (4.16)    
Cruise -0.0382*      -0.0423*      -0.0404*      -0.0361*      -0.0402*   
 (-2.59)            (-2.83)     (-2.44)    (-2.21)    (-2.77)    
lnFUND  0.0264        0.0290   
  (1.32)        (1.38)   
IQ   0.0517        0.0470  
   (1.45)        (1.22)  
LnFUND_IQ     0.0103    
     (1.36)    
Constant included YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.405         0.408         0.412         0.408         0.405    
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
4.3.  Results for countries with different institutions quality index 
(high vs low) 
Additional analysis was performed, but on different subsamples. This 
time, within subsamples we had more homogenous groups of countries, that is 
countries with similar level of the institutional quality. More specifically, we 
ranked all EU27 Member States with regard to the value of the variable IQ and 
the first sample comprised 10 countries with the highest values, while the second 
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sample compired 10 countries with the lowest values.3 The results of the 
estimaton for the 10 highest ranked countries in terms of the institutional quality 
indicate very different results compared to the previously evaluated regressions 
and are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Results of the estimation of equation 12 for MS with the highest institution quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
L.lnY -0.191*       -0.186**     -0.193**      -0.204**      -0.185** 
 (-3.06)       (-3.36)       (-4.12)       (-3.44)       (-3.32)    
lnSK 0.0362       0.00586        0.0111        0.0438       0.00590    
 (0.59)        (0.10)        (0.24)        (0.83)        (0.10) 
lnSH 0.109*        0.118*        0.117         0.106*        0.118*   
 (3.03)          (2.32) (2.22)        (2.94)        (2.30)    
Cruise -0.0181 -0.0168* -0.0164* -0.0173 -0.0164* 
 (-1.82) (-2.43) (-2.70) (-1.98) (-2.38) 
lnFUND  0.208*** 0.200***   
  (7.94) (7.70)   
IQ   -0.0256 -0.0484  
   (-0.52) (-1.08)  
LnFUND_IQ     0.0805*** 
     (9.23) 
Constant included YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.154           0.189 0.184         0.153         0.191    
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The contribution of EU funds to the economic growth is positive and has 
a very high statistical significance, while the investment rate is no longer 
statistically significant contribuent to economic growth. The institutional quality 
taken separately as an explanatory variable is insignificant, which is perhaps to be 
expected given the previous results. However, a very important difference in the 
significance of parameter that measures the impact of EU funds is noticed for 
countries with high values of IQ. This could mean that the institutional quality is 
a requirement for the effective apsorption of EU funds in terms of the impact on 
the economic growth rate. Countries that have not reached the appropriate level 
of institutional quality, according to the results of analysis, can not expect a 
positive impact of Cohesion policy instruments to economic growth if the level of 
                                                            
3 A group of ten highest-ranked countries in terms of the institutional quality comprised of following: 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Germany, Ireland and 
Belgium. A group of ten countries ranked lowest in the institutional quality were: Romania, Bulgaria, 
Italy, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
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institutional quality doesn’t reach an adequate level. This confirms the 
correctness of the approach of the EU when it comes to pre-accession funds, 
where a significant portion of pre-accession assistance to candidate countries is 
focused on transition assistance and institution building. 
Table 9 
Results of the estimation of equation 12 for MS with the lowest institution quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
L.lnY -0.176**      -0.198**     -0.230**      -0.213**      -0.188** 
 (-4.15)            (-4.24)      (-3.68)    (-3.48)   (-4.05) 
lnSK 0.141**       0.147**       0.154**       0.149**       0.145** 
 (4.03)        (4.19)        (3.77)        (3.72)        (4.06)    
lnSH 0.217**       0.198**       0.222**       0.239**       0.198** 
 (4.21)        (3.84)        (3.47)        (3.96)        (3.88)    
Cruise -0.0417*     -0.0432**       -0.0387* -0.0372*      -0.0418** 
 (-3.16)       (-3.45)       (-2.96)       (-2.75)       (-3.29) 
lnFUND  0.0243        0.0209   
  (1.19)        (0.97)   
IQ   0.0670        0.0701  
   (2.05)        (2.15)  
LnFUND_IQ     0.0103 
     (1.14)    
Constant included YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.433         0.436         0.451         0.450         0.433    
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 9 shows the results for the ten member states with the lowest level 
of the institutional quality. The results show quite a big difference compared to 
the previous results for countries with high institutional quality. Coefficient of 
SFCF funds is no longer statistically significant in this case. The variable 
institutional quality, although not significant according to the standard criteria 
(5%), is significant with a significance level at 10% and has a positive sign. If we 
consider changes in this parameter in comparison with previous sample, we argue 
that the results indicatate that at a lower level of institutional development, the 
focus of the policy makers should be on improving the quality of the institutions, 
which initially already provides opportunities for potentially higher growth rates 
for the economy. When the institutional quality reaches a sufficiently high level, 
absorption of EU funds should improve, which will in turn lead to higher growth 
rates. 
Obviously, our research has couple of limitations, first being that the 
objects of the analysis, that is, panel units, were countries, while regions are the 
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most important unit in the context of Cohesion policy. The reason for choosing 
country level analysis was lack of availability of data at the regional level for all 
EU countries. Moreover, one has always need to have in mind the technical issues 
regarding institutional quality measurements.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Results of the analysis indicate that the contribution of the SFCF funds 
to the economic growth is significant only in those countries where the 
institutional quality is at the high level. These results are in the favor of critics of 
the Cohesion Policy and its instruments, who claim that that policy has not 
reached its full potential and that for the most part, only serves as a redistributive 
mechanism of transfers from richer to poorer countries without the real impact on 
the economic growth and the convergence process. However, the results indicate 
that the countries with the low institutional quality could have a positive impact 
on economic growth if they improve the institutional quality. 
Since the analysis confirmed the convergence of economic growth of EU 
member states, and that the contribution of SFCF funds to economic growth was 
only evident in countries with higher quality institutions, which are generally at 
higher level of economic development, it seems that the forces of economic 
integration are stronger than the impact of the Cohesion policy instruments. 
Beforementioned facts lead to the conclusion that investing in the 
development and improvement of the institutional quality of the EU member 
states with lower quality is desirable, especially due to the fact that in the first 
phase, such investments will have a direct positive impact on economic growth. 
When the institutional quality of a particular Member State reaches a satisfactory 
level, then the SFCF funds will begin to contribute to the economic growth. In 
this sense, one can consider the development of specific instruments of Cohesion 
policy which would further emphasize the former practice of strengthening 
institutional capacity, or increase the institutional quality, with the aim of 
increasing the impact of SFCF funds. Finally, the limitations of our research, as 
mentioned in previous section, could serve as starting points in future work on 
this research topic. 
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INSTRUMENTI KOHEZIJSKE POLITIKE I 
EKONOMSKI RAST: JESU LI INSTITUCIJE VAŽNE? 
 
Sažetak 
Kohezijska politika Europske unije predstavlja složen sustav fiskalnih transfera 
kojima se želi ubrzati ekonomska i socijalna kohezija. U ovom radu provedeno je 
empirijsko istraživanje na temelju ocjenjivanja više regresijskih jednadžbi 
ekonomskog rasta s ciljem utvrđivanja doprinosa Kohezijskog i strukturnih 
fondova ekonomskom rastu zemalja članica EU u razdoblju od 2000. do 2013. 
godine. Za nezavisnu varijablu, između ostalih, odabran je indeks kvalitete 
institucija. Rezultati analize na cjelokupnom uzorku zemalja ukazuju na to da, 
iako se potvrđuje postojanje konvergencije, strukturni i Kohezijski fond nemaju 
utjecaj na ekonomski rast. Jednako tako, utvrđeno je da kvaliteta institucija 
zasebno, niti u interakciji sa sredstvima strukturnih i Kohezijskog fonda nije 
statistički značajan čimbenik ekonomskog rasta u skupini EU27, ali se rezultati 
značajno mijenjaju ako se osnovni uzorak razdvoji na zemlje s visokom i niskom 
razinom kvalitete institucija.  
Ključne riječi: SFCF, institutional quality, economic growth, convergence  
JEL klasifikacija: E02, O43 
 
 
 
 

  
